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NOTES
THE EFFECT OF ACCEPTING A WORTHLESS CHECK
WHERE THE PARTIES CONTEM-PLATE A CASH SALE
The term "cash sale" when used in its technical sense means
a simultaneous exchange of the possession and title of goods for
the purchase price.' Distinguishable from this kind of sale are
those (1) where title passes but possession is retained until
payment of the price, which might be termed a "sale with lien
reserved," and (2) where possession passes but title is retained,
which using the term broadly, might be called a "conditional
sale." 2 Since it is practically impossible to make an absolutely
contemporaneous exchange of the goods for the price, most
courts hold that a sale does not lose its character as a "cash
sale" if the parties have manifestly agreed to regard the exchange
as coincidental, and the delay is no greater than the circum-
stances require.3 But where the goods are delivered and the
price is not simultaneously paid, certain circumstances such
as (a) the extension of credit by agreement or usage,4 (b) the
delivery of the goods without mentioning payment, 5 or (c) the
failure to promptly reclaim possession0 may operate as a waiver
of the contemporaneous cash payment."
I
Where the bargain contemplates a technical cash sale and
payment is by check which proves to be worthless, the deter-
:Williston, Sales (2 Vols. 1924), sec. 341.
2 Ibid.
3For example, where the seller is to make delivery directly to
the buyer and the goods are to be paid for when delivered, or where
the goods are bulky-such as coal and lumber, or where there is to
be an inspection or verifying of accounts, there may be a necessary
delay between the time of handing over the goods and the payment of
the price; and yet the transaction may remain a technical "cash sale".
See Leven v. Smith, 1 Denio 571 (N. Y. 1845); Burns v. Bigelow, 122
N. Y. S. 255 (1910); Rehr v. Trumbull Lumber Co., 110 Ohio St. 218,
143 N. E. 558 (1924); Vold, Handbook of the Law of Sales (1931)
172, 173. For 9, criticism of this view see Williston, op. cit. supra,
sec. 343, 346, n. 1.
IHaskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514 (1874); Maley-Thompson &
Moffett Co. v. Thomas Forman Co., 179 Mich. 548, 146 N. W. 95 (1914).5Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514 (1874).
0-French v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67 Atl. 45 (1907). But see note
(1931) 36 Dick. L. Rev. 276 at 279-282.
TNote 11 L. R. A. (N. S. 1908) 948; Vold, op. cit., svpra n. 3,
172, 173.
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mination of the ownership of the goods may raise the question of
whether the simultaneous cash payment has been waived. In
one line of cases the solution of the problem of waiver is based
on the theory that a check is conditional payment only s unless
it is accepted as absolute.9 So, if the seller delivers the goods
and takes the purchaser's check for the price, the check does
not constitute payment until it is honored and the bargain
has not lost its character as a true cash sale. If then, the
check is dishonored the seller has not lost ownership in the
goods and may recover them from the original buyer.'0 As the
latter was never vested with any title the seller may recover
the goods even from a bona fide purchaser for value." But
where a worthless check was taken as payment and the vendor
gave the vendee possession and a negotiable bill of lading or
warehouse receipt representing the goods, the vendor was es-
topped from claiming ownership as against a bona fide subvendee
who purchased in reliance on the vendee's muniments of title.12
Similarly, if there has been an unreasonable delay by the original
seller in presenting the dishonored check for payment, the
'Marlash, Law of Sales (1930) 120; 23 R. C. L. 1388; 55 C. J. 520,
579.
, Goddard Grocer Co. v. Freedman, 127 S. W. (2d) 759 (Mo. App.
1939) (Alternative holding); Vold, op. cit. supra, n. 3, p. 174; Mariash,
op. cit. supra, n. 8, p. 121; 55 C. J. 579.10Note 31 A L. R. 578, 579-581 (1924); Vold, op. cit. supra n. 3,
p. 174; Note 24 Geo. L. J. 165, 172 (1935); 55 C. J. 579.
nBarksdale v. Banks, 206 Ala. 569, 90 So. 913 (1921); Clark v.
Hamilton Diamond Co., 209 Cal. 1, Pac. 915 (1930); Galeppi v. C.
Swanston & Son, 107 Cal. App. 30, 290 Pac. 116 (1930); Chafin v. Cox,
147 S. E. 154 (Ga. App. 1929); National Bank of Com. v. Chicago,
Burl. & N. Ry., 44 Minn. 224, 46 N. W. 342 (1890); Gustafson v.
Equitable Loan Assn., 186 Minn. 236, 243 N. W. 106 (1932), noted in
17 Minn. L. Rev. 105; Johnson v. Iankovetz, 57 Ore. 24, 110 Pac. 398(1910); Young v. Harrls-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S W. 125
(1924); John S. Hale & Co. v. Beley Cotton Co., 154 Tenn. 689, 290
S. W. 944 (1927); Note, 54 A. L. R. 526 (1928). Contra; Parr v.
Helfrich, 108 Neb. 801, 189 N. W. 281 (1922); Comer v. Cunningham,
77 N. Y. 391 (1879) semble; Note 31 A. L. R. 578, 581; see, Chadd v.
Byers State Bank, 111 Kan. 279, 206 Pac. 880, 881 (1922) ; Boyd v. Bank
of Mercer Co., 174 Mo. App. 431, 160 S. W. 587, 588 (1913); Morehouse
v. Keyport Auto Sales Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 368, 179 Atl. 279, 280-281 (1935);
Ditton v. Purcell, 21 N. D. 648, 132 N. W. 347, 349 (1911); C. M. Keys
Comm. Co. v. Beatty, 42 Okla. 721, 142 Pac. 102, 1103 (1914); Lee v.
Marion Natl. Bank, 167 S. C. 169, 166 S. E. 148, 160-161 (1932).
2 Ammon v. Gamble-Robinson Comm. Co., 111 Minn. 452, 127 N. W.
448 (1910) (warehouse receipt); Johnson-Brinkman Comm. Co. v.
Central Bank, 116 Mo. 558, 22 S. W. 813 (1893) (bill of lading); Parma
v First Natl. Bank (Comm. of App. Tex.) 63 S. W. (2d) 692 (1933)
(bill of lading).
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equitable defense of laches may prevent him from asserting
his title to the goods against an innocent subpurchaser. 13
II
Professor Williston believes the decisions are unsound which
hold that a check is conditional payment and that no property
in the goods is transferred until the check is paid. 14 He urges
that there "has been confusion of thought in supposing that the
condition in conditional payment by means of negotiable paper
has any reference to the ownership of property given in exchange
for the paper."1 5 His contention is that the seller has assented
to the transfer of ownership in the goods, for at the time of the
delivery no restriction is placed on the purchaser's use of the
goods nor even on his right to transfer them. This reasoning
appears to be sound.
The common law of sales has been codified in the Uniform
Sales Act, and the following provisions relate to the instant
problem:
"Section 18-(1) Where there is a contract to sell specific or ascer-
tained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such
time as the parties intend it to be transferred.
(2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties,
regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the
parties, usages of trade and the circumstances of the case.6
Section 19. Unless a different intention appears, the following
are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time
at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer:
Rule 1. Where there is an unconditional contract to sell specific
goods, in a deliverable state, the property passes to the buyer when
the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of pay-
ment, or the time of delivery, or both, be postponed."'1
Though in the early law of sales it was presumed that unless
there was an agreement for the extension of credit the trans-
action was a cash sale,' s it seems clear that under the above
sections of the Sales Act the presumption is now that unless a
contrary intention affirmatively appears, the property in specific
goods passes at once regardless of when payment is to be
-,'Pohl v. Johnson, 179 Minn. 398, 229 N. W. 555 (1930); Oldridge
v. Sutton, 157 Mo. App. 485, 137 S. W. 994 (1911); see Goddard Grocer
Co. v. Freedman, 127 S. W. (2d) 759, 762 (Mo. App. 1939).
" 4Williston, op. cit. supra, n. 1, sec. 346a. The same material is
found in Williston, Law of Contracts (Rev. ed., 8 Vols. 1936) sec. 732.
sIbid.
16Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 1936) sect. 2651b-18.
27Id., see. 2651b-19.
33Vold, op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 176; Williston, op. cit. supra n. 1;
sec. 342, 343.
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made. Actually, when a check is exchanged for goods the
parties do not ordinarily have any conscious intent. The seller
intends for the buyer to use the goods as his own, but expects
to receive payment. 19 He does not consider the check as
absolute payment, but regards it as a means of obtaining his
money; so in reality the seller is extending credit to the buyer
for a short period.20 Any argument that the intention of the
seller is to retain the ownership of the goods until the check
is paid seems untenable. Then in the light of the provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act the property in the goods passes to
the buyer when the goods are delivered and the check is given
for the purchase price.21
Upon examination of the cases22 holding that the original
vendor may reclaim the goods from an innocent subvendee
when the original vendee has given a worthless check for the
price, it is noticed that in only two of them the Sales Act had
been adopted by the state in which the case arose.23 The court
of Minnesota had held, prior to the adoption of the Act, in
National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, Burl. & N. Ry.24 that the
vendor could recover the goods from an innocent subvendee
when the original vendee had given a worthless check as pay-
ment. In the first case 25 decided after the Sales Act was
embodied in the Minnesota statutes the court ignored the Act
and relied on the previous case as authority. The Tennessee
court in Young v. Harris-Cortner Co.26 reached the same result,
relying on the earlier Mfinnesota decision, but referred to Sections
18 and 19 of the Uniform Sales Act, szpra, and quoted a part of
section 343 of Prof. Williston's Treatise on Sales. 27 Apparently
it misunderstood the view expressed by Prof. Williston, and it
is submitted that the court erroneously interpreted the Sales
Act.
"13 Ore. L. Rev. 177, 178 (1933).
38 Yale L. J. 1154 (1929).
213 Ore. L. Rev. 177 (1933); 4 St. Johns L. Rev. 85 (1929).
See cases cited, supra n. 11.
2 Ala., Calif., Ga., and Ore. had not adopted the Sales Act at the
time the cases cited in n. 11 were decided, but Oregon later adopted
it. Minn. adopted the Act in 1917 and Tenn. in 1918.
2144 Minn. 224, 46 N. W. 342 (1890).
"Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Assoc., 186 Minn. 236, 243 N. W.
106 (1932), noted in 17 Minn. L. Rev. 105.
m152 Tenn. 15, 268 S. W. 125 (1924).
2Supra n. 1.
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III
The decisions holding that a check is only conditional pay-
ment and that title to the goods does not pass until the check
is honored seem to be a result of a sympathy for the seller, and
of the belief that a contrary rule would result in the decreased
transferability of goods. Such an attitude is expressed in Young
v. Harris-ortner Co., supra, where the court said:
'We feel safe in saying that as a matter of custom and con-
venience, most of the cash transactions of the country are paid with
checks. A farmer brings his cotton, tobacco or wheat to town for sale
and sells same, and, as a general rule, is paid by check, although all
of such sales are treated as cash transactions. If, in such a case, thepurchaser can immediately resell to an innocent party and convey good
.title, it would follow that vendors would refuse to accept checks and
would require the actual money, which would result in great incon-
venience and risk to merchants engaged in buying such produce since
it would require them to keep on hand large sums of actual cash.
This would result in revolutionizing the custom of merchants in such
matters."-'
But the same line of reasoning might well be advanced for
protecting the interests of an innocent subvendee. 29 Under the
theory of the Harris-Cortner Co. case it would be necessary
for the buyer either to determine whether any prior vendee
had given a false check in exchange for the goods about to be
purchased, or else accept the risk of having the goods reclaimed.
Surely such a requirement could not be said to increase the
transferability of goods.
The use of checks as payment in business transactions
benefits both the buyer and the seller. If the buyer may pay
for his purchases by check it is unnecessary for him to keep
large amounts of money in his possession. But it is to the
seller's advantage to accept checks instead of money as payment,
for his sales are thereby increased, as well as his commissions
or profits. Then if the rule be adopted that the vendor transfers
the ownership in the goods when he accepts a check in a sale,
it would be to the vendor's own interests to continue the prac-
tice. It seems only fair that the seller should assume the risk
of receiving an occasional worthless check, since the increased
profits would exceed the losses. In any specific instance should
the seller be unwilling to take the risk of accepting the pro-
spective purchaser's check, he may demand cash on delivery
152 Tenn. 15, 268 S. W. 125, 127 (1924).
21 See Vold, op. cit. supra n. 3, 379, where he gives the reasons
for protecting a b.f.p. in cases of fraud.
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without losing the sale by using a public carrier. So the
negotiability of goods would not be diminished by holding that
the property in the goods is transferred when a check is given
in exchange for them.
The theory that no title passes where the parties con-
templated a cash sale and payment was by a worthless check
and that the goods could therefore be recovered from a bona fide
subvendee, seems to have been found not entirely satisfactory by
at least one state which adopted it. In Chafin v. Cox °3 the
Georgia court followed the above theory and refused to protect
an innocent subpurchaser. But in Brumby Chair Co. v. City of
Columbus,31 decided three years later, the appellate court ap-
parently recognized that the result reached in the earlier de-
cision was not the most desirable. In the latter case the original
vendee gave a check for furniture and resold it to an innocent
third party. The check was dishonored when presented by
the original vendor, but the court held that he could not
recover the goods from the innocent subvendee, on the ground
that it was a conditional sale and the contract of sale was not in
writing and recorded as provided in the Conditional Sales
Statute of Georgia. This conclusion is in accord with Prof.
Williston's contention that even though the parties have agreed
that the seller should not give up his title until the price is
paid, it is still true that the delivery and permission to the
buyer to use the goods as his own is inconsistent with the
theory of a cash sale. Instead a conditional sale has been
substituted and the transaction should be dealt with according
to the rules governing conditional sales.32
When a check is returned unpaid to the seller he has,
of course, an action at law for the price. If the check is given
with intent to defraud, under Prof. Williston's theory, the
buyer has a voidable title33 and the seller may rescind the
contract and reclaim the goods, unless they are in the hands
of a bona fide purchaser for value.34 The view that the seller
transfers the property in the goods when a worthless check
147 S. E. 154 (Ga. App. 1929).
46 Ga. App. 163, 167 S. E. 221 (1932).
12Williston, op. cit. supra n. 1, sec. 346; see also see. 346b.
MWilliston, op. cit. supra n. 1, sec. 346a.
"Uniform Sales Act, sec. 24; the corresponding section in the
Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 1936) is 2651b-24.
K. L. J.-5
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is given for the price was adopted in an English case, 35 in
which the court refused to allow the seller to reclaim the goods
from an innocent subpurchaser. There is some American
authority in support of that doctrine.30 It is admitted that
in a number of the worthless check cases there is no actual
fraud, as for example where the buyer is merely careless and
overdraws his checking account. In such cases the better rule
seems to be that the seller would have assumed the risk of
relying on the original vendee's credit should his check be
dishonored.
IV
No Kentucky cases were found deciding whether property
in goods passes in a sale where the seller accepted a worthless
check. In Arnett v. Cloudas37 the vendor accepted counterfeit
money as the purchase price of a slave, and executed a bill of
sale to the vendee. The court refused to allow the seller to
recover the slave from a bona fide purchaser, basing its de-
cision on two grounds: (1) the slave was obtained by fraud,
but the contract could not be avoided after an innocent third
party had bought it; (2) the seller had given the buyer
possession of the chattel and the muniments of title. However,
the language of the court indicates that the same result would
have been reached even though a bill of sale had not been de-
livered to the original vendee. It seems possible to distinguish
between counterfeit money and a worthless check. When a
seller receives money in a cash sale he does not regard the
buyer as issuing it, but accepts it without any condition as
payment of the purchase price. On the other hand when a
check is given for the price the seller looks to the maker of
the check for its payment, and accepts it as something that
can subsequently be converted into money.
' Phillips v. Brooks, Ltd. 1919 (2) K. B. 243 (forged check).
30Parr v. Helfrich, 108 Neb. 801, 189 N. W. 281 (1922) (forged
check); Comer v. Cunningham, 77 N. Y. 391 (1879) (payment
remanded); Ditton v. Purcell, 21 N. D. 648, 132 N. W. 347 (1911)
(dishonored checks); Mariash, op. cit. supra n. 8, p. 535, (In the
first case cited and in the English case cited in n. 34 the check involved
was forged, but there seems to be no valid distinction between a
forged check and a "cold" check in the determination of the ownership
of the goods. In either case the seller has the same intention; there
is however the added factor of mistaken identity of the drawer, when
the check is forged,. which gives the seller the remedy of rescission
except as against a b.f.p.)
34 Ky. 299 (4 Dana 1836).
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In Carter v. Richardson38 the vendee attempted to establish
a boiza fide purchase for value from a vendor who had sold him
a stock of goods with the intent to defraud his creditors. The
transaction was apparently understood by the parties to be a
cash sale and the buyer gave his check for the price; but the
court said that the check was not in itself payment, and that
the buyer had learned of the fraud in time to countermand
payment of the check before its presentation. In a later Ken-
tucky case 39 the premium on a fire policy was paid by a check
which was dishonored. The company wrote the insured a letter
directing him to return the policy and his check would then
be returned. The insured property was destroyed before the
letter was received, but it was held that the insurer was not
liable. Though this case did not involve the transfer of title
to property the court's opinion contains this statement:
"Under the head of Sales, with reference to the payment of the
purchase price by check, the rule is thus written in 23 R. C. L., page
1388; 'The acceptance of a buyer's check is not regarded as payment
but only as conditional payment, and if the check is dishonored on
due presentation the seller's right to reclaim the property is not
lost.' ,,0
The last two decisions seem to subscribe to the theory that a
check is only conditional payment, and the dietum in the latter
case indicates that the court might allow a vendor to reclaim
the property, at least from the original vendee.
If an invalid check and counterfeit money are dis-
tinguishable, it appears that the Kentucky court is not bound
by prior decisions to follow either the view held by Prof. Willis-
ton or the theory that where the parties have contemplated a
cash sale, accepting a worthless check does not pass title to the
goods until the check is paid. The theory that a check is only
conditional payment does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that title has not passed when the goods are exchanged for
the check. But assuming that there are no Kentucky cases
deciding the problem under discussion, it is submitted that the
adoption of the Uniform Sales Act by the General Assembly,4 1
makes it necessary under sections 18 and 19 of that act for the
" 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1204, 60 S. W. 397 (1901).
'*Ratliff v. St. Paul Fire Insurance Co., 207' Ky. 492, 269 S. W.
546 (1925).
-Id. at 495, S. W. at 547.
'1Kentucky Acts (1928) c. 148, p. 481.
KENTUCKY Liw JOUnNAL
Kentucky Court to adopt the view as expressed by Prof. Willis-
ton.
CONCLUSION
Should the question arise, it is submitted that the Kentucky
Court should adopt the rule that the ownership is transferred
to the buyer when he gives a check in exchange for the goods,
unless there is an affirmative manifestation of a contrary in-
tention. Further, if such a contrary intention is affirmatively
shown the transaction is not a "cash sale" since the title would
be withheld, and therefore any laws requiring the recording
of conditional sales contracts42 must be complied with before
the goods could be reclaimed from a bona fide purchaser. (For
value without notice.) It is believed that this rule should be
applied because:
1. It is supported by sound legal reasoning;
2. The plain meaning of the Uniform Sales Act makes
the adoption of the rule necessary if any effect is to
be given to that statute;
3. The economic interests of the general public would
be better served by its operation.
R. VINCENT GooDILETT
42 Though Kentucky has not adopted the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act, the court held in Munez v. National Bond & Investment Co., 243
Ky. 293, 47 S. W. (2d) 1055 (1932), that unless conditional sales are
recorded they shall be void as to any purchaser from the original
vendee, if that purchaser acquires the goods in good faith, for value,
and without notice. See Simeon S. Willis, Uniform and Conditional
Sales, (1934) 22 Ky. L. J. 278.
